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Universal Jurisdiction and the Concept of a Fair Trial
Prosecutor v. Fulgence Niyonteze: A Swiss Military Tribunal
Case Study
Joshua E. Kastenberg*
On April 30, 1999, in a case titled Prosecutor v.
Niyonteze, a Swiss military court convicted a former Rwandan
mayor for war crimes committed during the 1994 Rwandan
genocide. Prior to 2001, this was the only time a Rwandan
suspect had been tried by a court other than the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) or a Rwandan national
court.' Indeed, it may constitute the first time that a nation's
military tribunal exercised universal jurisdiction over either an
individual it had no connection to or an offense it had no nexus
with. Yet, little attention was given to this trial by international
legal scholars. Moreover, international human rights groups,
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, did not
criticize the Swiss decision to prosecute. Even the United
Nations did not protest the Niyonteze trial. Within Europe, no
* Joshua E. Kastenberg, Major, USAF (BA UCLA, MA Purdue
University, JD Marquette University, LLM Georgetown, with highest
honors) is a judge advocate in the United States Air Force Judge
Advocate General Corps. He is currently stationed in Germany where
he advises the Air Force and NATO components in international and
criminal law issues. Major Kastenberg wishes to thank the editorial
staff of the University of Miami School of Law International and
Comparative Law Review for their hard work and professor David
Stewart for his continued advice. He also wishes to thank his wife,
Elizabeth, and Allenby & Clementine Kastenberg for their love and
untiring support.
In 2001, Belgium prosecuted two nuns, a physics professor, and a
former government minister for their role in the Rwandan genocide.
United States Department of State International Religious Freedom
Report for Rwanda (released October 26, 2001). These individuals
were prosecuted under the Belgian universal jurisdiction law. Belgian
Loi Relative a la Repression des Violations Graves de Droit
International Humanitaire (Feb. 10, 1999), in MONITEUR BELGE §
7 (Mar. 23, 1999), (allows prosecution under the universality principle),
cited by Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke White, An
International Constitutional Movement, 43 HARV. J. INT'L LAW, 1, 9
(2002).
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visible protest occurred against a military tribunal exercising
universal jurisdiction. The fact that the trial occurred within the
jurisdiction of Swiss military law is somewhat remarkable given
the trend towards a European distaste of military trials.
2
It is the overall goal of this article to assess and evaluate
concepts of universal jurisdiction and the interrelated right to a
fair trial within the capsule of Prosecutor v. Niyonteze. This
article analyzes the Niyonteze trial both within a framework of
comparative law and against contemporary international law
theories of universal jurisdiction and fair trial standards. In this
article the term "due process" is subsumed into the larger
concept of a fair trial. Likewise, a specific theory of universal
jurisdiction is adopted. While universal jurisdiction and the right
to a fair trial are often seen as exclusive areas, this article
advances a theory of interrelationship.
Part I provides relevant background information
regarding both the Rwandan genocide and Niyonteze's role in it.
Additionally, Niyonteze's trial and two subsequent appeals are
covered. Both an overview of the Rwandan genocide and
Niyonteze's trial are important for analyzing the twin issues of
universal jurisdiction and the right to a fair trial. 3 Part II
2 See, e.g., Report of the Commission on Human Rights, Application
No. 22107/93, cited in Judge J.W. Rant, The British Courts-Martial
System: It Aint Broke but it Needs Fixing, 152 MIL. L. REV 179, 180
(1996); Wing Commander Simon P. Rowlinson, The British System of
Military Justice, 52 A.F. L. REv. 17, 18-20 (2002). Wing Commander
Rowlinson writes of the influence of the European Court of Human
Rights in reforming the British Court-Martial system.
3 Black's Law Dictionary defines a fair and impartial trial as "a hearing
by an impartial and disinterested tribunal; a proceeding which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial consideration or evidence and facts as a
whole." The dictionary cites Raney v. Commonwealth for the
proposition that a fair trial is "one where the accuser's legal rights are
safeguarded and respected. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 596 (6th ed.
1990). See also Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961), holding:
More than one student of society has expressed the view that
not the least significant test of the quality of a civilization is its
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analyzes the evolving concept of universal jurisdiction as well as
the accompanying guarantees of a right to a fair trial. The
fundamental right to a fair trial in international law rests on
several pillars. Three of these 'pillars' are the right to competent
counsel, the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over
offenses, and notice of both criminality and jurisdiction.
Understanding these principles is essential to evaluate the
fairness of Prosecutor v. Niyonteze and to analyze the
practicality of future state-sponsored trials over war crimes. Part
III compares the due process framework and practice of
Niyonteze's trial with the ICTR case, Prosecutor v. Akayesu.4
This comparison is rooted in the fact that the two cases have
been viewed as "practical companions. 5 Again, in determining
the fairness of Niyonteze, a comparative analysis is helpful. This
is primarily accomplished by comparing the performance of both
trials from a perspective of the defendant's right to a fair trial.
At the outset, it is essential to note that the Akayesu record of
trial and appeals is far more voluminous than the record for
Niyonteze. Finally, the article concludes with an assessment that
while Switzerland provided Niyonteze with a fair trial rooted in
an international understanding of due process, a trial perhaps
fairer than the ICTR case of Akayesu, state practice should be
utilized very rarely.
treatment of those charged with a crime, particularly with
offenses which arouse the passions of a community. One of
the rightful boasts of Western civilization is that the state has
the burden of establishing guilt solely on the basis of the
evidence produced in court and under circumstances assuring
an accused all the safeguards of a fair trial.
Id., at 729 (Frankfurter J. concurring).
4 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, judgment of trial chamber, ICTR-96-4-T
(1996) [hereinafter ICTR-96-4-T].
5 Bernard Oxman & Luc Reydams, International decision: Niyonteze
v. Public Prosecutor, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 231, 235 (2002).
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I. Background to the Rwandan Genocide
A. Generally
Between April and July 1994, somewhere between
500,000 and over one million persons belonging to a distinct
ethnic group, the Tutsi, were executed by Rwandan government
forces, their intermediaries, and supporters. 6 Individuals
considered by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council to be
the perpetrators or main participants of this genocide were
ultimately indicted and, in an ongoing process, brought to trial
before an ad hoc tribunal specifically created to punish those
offenders under international law.7 To understand the ICTR and
its approach to prosecuting persons deemed responsible for this
genocide, it is essential to understand - albeit briefly - the
background to the genocide itself. Understanding the historic
background to the Rwandan genocide is also imperative to
analyzing Niyonteze's trial, both from a perspective of universal
jurisdiction and due process.
Prior to 1994, Rwanda was the most densely populated
country in Africa.8 From 1897 until 1917 most of its territory
was ruled by Germany through a colonial administration. 9 From
1917 through its eventual independence, Rwanda was governed
by Belgium through a mandate granted by the League of
Nations.10 The Belgian colonial administration in its African
territories, such as Rwanda, promoted a descending superiority




9 Robert F. van Lierop, Report on the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMPOSIUM 203, 207-08 (1999).
van Leirop argues that German and later Belgian colonial authorities
drove the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi to even further
prominence. Id. This argument appears to have been adopted by the
ICTR in several trial chamber decisions. See also RICHARD F. NYROP




accordingly. 1 This stratification formed the basis for decades of
post-colonial upheaval.12 The colonial administration was also
responsible for repression and other human rights violations.
Belgian colonial authorities vested a minority indigenous ethnic
group, the Tutsi, with substantial benefits that were deprived to
the majority ethnic group, the Hutu.' 3 Indeed, the authorities
recognized a Tutsi monarchy, subservient to Belgian authority,
but above that of any Hutu form of government. In 1956, the
United Nations Trusteeship Council directed Belgium to
organize elections on the basis of universal suffrage. "5
Essentially, four political parties were formed largely on ethnic
lines.' 6 As a result of these elections, the Hutu gained a political
majority. 17 From November 1959 until October 18, 1960, a
series of ethnic-based attacks, reprisals, and counter-reprisals
occurred between the Hutu's majority party and the Tutsi
"Peter Uvin, On counting, categorizing, and violence in Burundi and
Rwanda, 148, 149-50, in CENSUS AND IDENTITY, THE POLITICS OF
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND LANGUAGE IN NATIONAL CENSUS (Kertzer &
Arel ed. 2002). The five categories of race from descending order
were: Europeans, "Mulattos" referring to children of white males and
African females, Asians, Tutsi (labeled as "blacks not submitted to
customary chiefs"), and Hutu (labeled as "indigenous"). Id
'2 1d
13 ICTR 96-4-T, 82-84. According to evidence from a prosecution
expert, Dr. Alison De Forges, the population percentages in 1930 were
composed as follows: 84% Hutu, 15% Tutsi, and 1% Twa. As of
1930, every Rwandan was required to carry an identification certificate
and be identified as a member of either ethnic group. Apparently this
practice continued after Rwandan independence and lasted until 1994.
Id14 id
1" Id. 87.
16 Id. 88. The four parties were the Parmehutu (MDR); the Union
Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) a party comprised of Tutsi
"monarchists"; the Aprosoma, a predominately Hutu group, and the
Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais (RADER), a combination of
Hutu and Tutsi moderates. Id.
17 id.
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minority.18 On that later date, Belgian authorities established an
autonomous provisional government headed by Gregoire
Kayibanda, the Hutu head of the majority Hutu party (hereafter
MDR). 19 In turn, a large population of Tutsi, including the
monarchy, fled to neighboring countries.20 These groups became
known as "exiles."
21
After Rwandan independence was declared on July 1,
1962, the MDR became the sole governing party under
Kayibanda.22 While large numbers of Tutsi fled Rwanda, some
of the population remained behind.23 Moreover, some groups
that had fled launched armed incursions into Rwanda,
destabilizing its economy.24 By 1973, Rwanda was wracked by
internal unrest, which coupled with the Tutsi incursions, led to
the collapse of Kayibanda's government. 25 Kayibanda's
successor, General Juvenal Habyarimana, achieved power by
armed force and had several opposition and political leaders
imprisoned and executed, including the former president.26
In 1975, Habyarimana instituted a one-party system
under his regime: the Mouvement revolutionanaire national pour
18 Id. See also Jose Alvarez, Crimes of State, Crimes of Hate: Lessons
from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 389 (1999). See also Uvin,
supra note 11, at 153. Professor Uvin writes that in early 1962 more
than 2,000 Tutsi were killed, and the following year, more than 10,000.
Over 40,000 fled Rwanda in 1963. Id.
'9 ICTR 96-4-T, 88.20 Id. See also, Nyrop, supra note 8, at 17.
21 ICTR 96-4-T, 88. See also Ogenga Otunnu, Rwandese Refugees
and Immigrants in Uganda, 3, 5-7, in THE PATH OF A GENOCIDE: THE
RWANDA CRISIS FROM UGANDA TO ZAIRE (HOWARD ADELMAN &
ASTRI SUHRKE 1999). Some of the Tutsi exiles were employed by Idi
Amin's regime in the Ugandan military and death squads. Amin
actively supported the exile's incursions into Rwanda. Id. at 14-15.







le developpement (MRND). 27 At first, Habyarimana's
government did not present itself as anti-Tutsi. However, by
1980, with a continually weakening economy and internal
dissension, the government became anti-Tutsi.28 On October 1,
1990 Tutsi exiles in Uganda launched a failed attack in
Rwanda. 29 The MNRD government's response to this attack
included the arrest of thousands of opposition members, mainly
Tutsi, in Rwanda. 30 However, some internal and international
pressure remained so that Habyarimana was pressured into
political multi-party recognition.31 Furthermore, his government
agreed to accept political reforms. 32 This action did not stop
Tutsi incursions into Rwanda because the government remained
unwilling to accept the free return of all exiles.33
As a result of the government's intransigence toward the
Tutsi exiles (RPF), their political organization's military wing,
the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), launched a large-scale
attack on Rwanda on October 1, 1991.34 From that time until a
cease-fire agreement in July 1992, Tutsi exile forces engaed in
open warfare with the Hutu dominated Rwandan military. 3 The
cease-fire allowed the RPF into Rwandan politics, but ultimately
this acceptance did not stem the RPA from continuing to attack
36Hutu targets. As a result, Hutu political groups grew
27 Id. 92
28 Id. 93. The government began systematically discriminating
against Tutsi by establishing quotas in universities, government
employment and services. Additionally, Hutu from Habyiramana's
native regions, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri were given preference.
29 Id.
30 Id. The Tutsi forces were joined under the aegis of a new political
group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) composed mainly of Tutsi
exiles in Uganda.
31 Id. 94.
32 Id. See also Alvarez, supra note 18, at 389.
33 ICTR 96-4-T, 95.34 Id. 93.
31 Id. 96.36 Id. 96, 97.
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increasingly anti-Tutsi and drew a harder-line toward the Tutsi
than Habyarimana. 37 For example, radio stations transmitted
anti-Tutsi propaganda. 38 However, a break in the fighting
appeared when both parties agreed to settle disputes by signing
parts of peace accords created in Arusha. 39 During this time,
Habyarimana made contradictory public statements both about
the peace-accords and the Tutsi in general.4 0  However, he
agreed publicly to implement the Arusha peace accords a.4 Then,
on April 6, 1994, while returning from a trip in Dar-es-Salaam,
Tanzania, he and the new Burundi president were killed when
their aircraft crashed in Rwanda.42 Although the cause of the
crash was not immediately determined, blame was quickly
placed on the RPA.
On April 7, 1994, the Presidential Guard and Hutu
militia, called interhamwe, began killing Tutsi and moderate
Hutu throughout parts of the country .43 Some of these victims,
such as the president of the Rwandan Supreme Court,
represented the best chance to avert genocide.4 4 Additionally,
the Rwandan Armed Forces executed ten United Nations
troops.45 In quickly erected detention centers and in the open, a
37 Id. 98.
38 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, No. 97-32-I 44 (ICTR (June 1, 2000)
available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ruggiu/judgment/rug010600.htm.




4 Id. 107. See also Alvarez, supra note 18, at 390. Interhamwe
stands for "those who stand together." Id., (citing PHILIP GOUREVITCH,
WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED
WITH OUR FAMILIES, 93 (1989).) According to Alvarez, the
Interhamwe were armed by French agents. Additionally, these French
agents were in control of Rwandan counter-insurgency operations.
4ICTR 96-4-T, 107.
45 Id. 108. See Alvarez, supra note 18, at 390. Alvarez writes that
after the execution of the ten Belgian soldiers, the U.N. peacekeeping
forces abandoned Rwanda. The Security Council eventually permitted
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wholesale slaughter of civilians occurred on a scale
unprecedented since 1945. Unlike the highly systematized "final
solution" of the Nazi genocide program, the Rwandan genocide
stemmed from a largely unplanned popular uprising.4 6 In several
cases, political leaders of prefectures and towns (communes)
became the local "movers and shakers" of the genocide.47
B. Fulgence Niyonteze's Role in the Genocide
and Subsequent Trial
In 1994, Niyonteze was employed as the bourgmestre
(mayor) of the Mushubati Commune. 48 During the outbreak of
the genocide he was in France, attending an educational
French troops into the area. However, the French were accused, with
some evidence, of defending the genocide's perpetrators. Id.46 Although persecutions and murders of Jewish individuals occurred in
Germany prior to its invasion of Poland in 1939, the "final solution"
was designed at the Wansee Conference. This conference was held on
January 20, 1942, at a villa in the Berlin suburb of Wansee to
coordinate the activities of German government agencies in developing
Zyklon-B gas, crematoria, and dedicated death camps for the "final
solution." The Wansee Conference was convened by Gestapo chief and
SS Commander Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the Reich Security
Main Office ("RHSA"), who indicated to the conference that "in the
course of this Final Solution of the European Jewish problem
approximately eleven million Jews are involved" - to be worked to
death or killed outright. See XIII Trials of War Criminals before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals 210-19 (Nuremberg Document No. NG-
2586-G), in WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD
REICH: A HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY, 965-66 (1990 fourth ed.).
41 See, e.g., Cecile E. M. Meijer, The War Crimes Research Office
Presents: News from the International Criminal Tribunals, 9 Hum. Rts.
Br. 30,33 (2002). In addition to Akayesu, the ICTR charged Ignace
Baglishema for war crimes. He was the bourgmestre of the Mabanza
commune. See Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, No. ICTR 95-1A-T (June 7,
2001) available at
http: www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Bagilishema/judgement/index.htm.
48 Oxman, supra note 5, at 231. See also Hirondelle News Agency
release 12 April 1999 at www.hirondelle.org.
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conference.49 Upon returning to Mushubati, Niyonteze convened
a "town meeting," where he reported to the local residents that
the commune received a "bad mark" because several Tutsi and
moderate Hutu were living within the commune unmolested. °
He urged the population to eliminate these individuals, by
ordering the meeting's attendants to "clear the brush."51
Some time later, Niyonteze made several visits to a
refugee camp in Kabgayi and encouraged the Tutsi Mushubati
residents seeking refuge there to return to the commune.52 Once
these residents returned to the commune they were slaughtered. 3
Additionally, while at the camp, he specifically ordered militia
troops to kill two individuals. 5 Finally, evidence was adduced
that Niyonteze routinely and actively encouraged the commune
population to murder Tutsi, and he at no time attempted to stop
persons from carrying out his orders.
55
In October 1994, Niyonteze arrived in Switzerland with
his family, where he sought political asylum.56 From that time
on, he resided in the canton of Fribourg. 7 In August 1996, the
Swiss government ordered him detained in the canton. 58
Normally, cantonal courts have jurisdiction over criminal
offenses. 59 However, in this case, Niyonteze was prosecuted
49 Oxman, supra note 5, at 232.
50 Hirondelle News Agency release, supra note 48.
5' Oxman, supra note 5, at 232, citing Niyonteze v. Public Prosecutor
(Trib. militaire de cassation Apr. 27, 2001)[hereinafter Niyonteze
cassation judgment].
52 Oxman, supra note 5, at 231-232, citing , International decision:
Niyonteze v. Public Prosecutor, 96 A.J.I.L. 231, 235 (2002) [hereinafter
Niyonteze trial judgment].
53 id.
54 Oxman, supra note 5, at 231-232.
" Id. at 233.56 Id. at 231.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 S. Treschel, Law of Criminal Procedure, in F. DESSEMONTET,
INTRODUCTION TO Swiss LAW, 246 (1995).
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before a national court. The decision to detain Niyonteze was
based on information from the ICTR as well as a non-
governmental organization (NGO) called the Association for
60International Justice in Rwanda (AJIR). Switzerland, however,
declined to extradite Niyonteze to Rwanda or the ICTR. 61
Shortly after his detention, the Swiss Military Attorney General
charged him under the Swiss Military Penal Code (CPM) with
murder (Article 116), incitement to commit murder (Articles 22
and 116), and violations of the laws and customs of war (Artilce
109).62 Niyonteze faced additional charges for war crimes under
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 63 and
Article 4(2)(a) of Additional Protocol 11.64 The indictment was
later amended to include genocide, incitement and complicity to
commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and incitement and
complicity to commit crimes against humanity.65 However, prior
to the military tribunal convening in Lausanne, the amendment
was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.66
Niyonteze's trial began on April 12, 1999. The military
tribunal was presided over by its president, Colonel Jean-Marc
60 Oxman, supra note 5, at 231.
61 id.
62 Id. at 232. Article 109 is discussed in full detail below.
63 Id. The specific charges fell under: Convention [No. I] for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 3, 75 UNTS 31; Convention
[No. II] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick,
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, Art
3 75 UNTS 85; Convention [No. III] Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Art 3, 75 UNTS 135; Convention
[No. IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 3 75 UNTS 287. Id.
64 Id. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, opened for signature, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609. Id.
65 The charges were based, in part, on the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
UNTS 277.
66 Oxman, supra note 5, at 232.
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Schwenter, a trained judge, two officers and two non-
commissioned soldiers. 7 Niyonteze was defended by two
appointed lawyers versed in the Swiss military code.68 One
month prior to the trial's opening, the prosecution, the tribunal,
and the defense traveled to Rwanda to observe on-site
evidence. 69 On the third day of the trial, Niyonteze refused to
attend the proceedings.7 °
Witnesses were permitted to testify anonymously in
front of the tribunal, and their identities were protected from the
public by using a single alphabetic letter. 71 However, witnesses
were not permitted to consult with lawyers during proceedings,
and their names were provided to the defense with the caveat of
non-disclosure.72 Ostensibly, the defense was given these names
to research and explore issues of witness bias and credibility.7
Niyonteze was permitted to defend against all
67 See, e.g., Niyonteze trial judgment.
68 Id. The lawyers were Mssrs Robert Assael and Vincent Spira. Mr.
Assael is currently a partner in the firm Poncet, Turrenttini, Amaudruz,
Neyroud, & Partners. His practice areas include criminal law and
international white collar criminal law. He received his law degree
from the University of Geneva in 1980. According to his firm's home
page, he currently represents a high level client in a Russian laundering
case. Likewise, Mr. Spira received his degree from the University of
Geneva in 1980. Information available at www.ptan.ch. (last visited
03/01/04).
69 Oxman, supra note 5, at 232. The Swiss procedure for pretrial on-
site inspections is called administration anticipee d'une prevue.
Compare Uniform Code of Military Justice, Rules for Courts-Martial
(RCM) 913(3) Views and Inspections. United States military courts-
martial have a similar procedure for on-site views and inspections of
evidence. However, these inspections occur as part of the formal trial
and not as a pretrial matter.
70 Oxman, supra note 5, at 232.
71 Witnesses Start Testifying Amid Special Measures to Protect Their
Identity, available at http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf (April





allegations. He contested the allegations on the basis of mistake
of fact, impossibility, lack of jurisdiction, and witness
credibility. 74 For example, Niyonteze, in his defense, admitted to
calling a town meeting and ordering the persons in attendance to
"clear the brush."05 However, he argued that he meant for them
to do nothing more than horticultural labor.76 Additionally, he
attacked witness credibility regarding the two named individuals
he allegedly ordered killed at the refugee camp. 7 Specifically,
he attacked the bias of prosecution witnesses testifying to their
recollection of what they saw Niyonteze do at the refugee
camp.78 In both Swiss civilian and military courts, all witnesses
are required to testify under oath and are subject to the criminal
sanction of perjury.
79
Niyonteze was permitted to call defense witnesses, voire
dire the tribunal members as to bias, and contest matters of law
before the tribunal. 80 He was also afforded the right to not
testify.81 Swiss criminal law permits questioning of an accused
only when that individual has chosen to testify on his or her
behalf, but if the individual chooses not to testify, he may not be
questioned. 82 In the end, Niyonteze's defense was not given
weight, and he was found guilty of the remaining charges.
Niyonteze was sentenced to life imprisonment with expulsion





79 Treschel, supra note 59, at 255.
80 Oxman, supra note 5, at 233.
81 Id.
82 Treschel, supra note 59, at 255. It should be noted that ordinarily a
court is not required to inform an accused of this right. However, in
1974, the Zurich Canton required informing an accused of the right not
to testify as a matter of due process. Interestingly, the Canton cited
Miranda v. Arizona as persuasive in its decision. Id. See also Zurich
Code of Criminal Procedure, 11.
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from Switzerland after the sentence was served. 3 Niyonteze's
trial lasted less than a month, with few breaks.84 The majority of
the trial was open to the public and media, in accordance with
Swiss law.
85
On appeal, the Tribunal militaire d'appel (hereafter
Military Appeals Tribunal) upheld most of the lower court's
factual findings, but reversed all convictions for murder and
incitement to commit murder on jurisdictional grounds. 86 The
Military Appeals Tribunal concluded the CPM does not confer
jurisdiction over civilians for these offenses.87 The Military
Appeals Tribunal upheld the convictions for war crimes.
Niyonteze argued notice deficiency in that civilians
could not be held accountable for the war crimes category under
which he was charged.88 In essence, he argued that only military
officers and high ranking government officials with control over
the military could meet the elements of the war crimes offense.
The Military Appeals Tribunal upheld the convictions based on
war crimes because it found Niyonteze had "regularly exercised
effective control over his administers [persons within his charge]
83 Oxman, supra note 5, at 234.
84 Id. at 235. See also U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices - Switzerland (2000).85Witnesses Start Testifying Amid Special Measures to Protect Their
Identity, supra note 73. A public trial is considered a fundamental right
in Swiss law. See Treschel, supra note 59, at 254, citing Weber v.
Switzerland, European Court of Human Rights, judgment of May 22,
1990, Series A, vol. 177.
86 See Judgment du Tribunal Militaire d'appel I A (Niyonteze v. Public
Prosecutor) (May 26, 2000) 4-5, 25-31 [hereinafter Niyonteze Trib.
App.], at http//www.trial-ch.org/Fichiers/Appe-FN-29mai00.pdf.. See
also Oxman, supra note 5, at 234; U.S. Department of State, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices - Switzerland (2000).
87 Niyonteze Trib. App. at 25-31. The court reversed on the indictment
to commit murder charge because it found that it involved an internal
armed conflict, which 109 CPM does not cover. 109 CPM presupposes
the existence of an international agreement. Absent such an agreement
109 CPM has no application. Id.
88 Id. at 6, 38-44.
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as well as some members of the FAR and interhamwe." 89 The
Military Appeals Tribunal also found that where he convened the
meeting and ordered individuals to "clear the brush," this
occurred in his capacity as a state agent. 90 Finally, it found
beyond a reasonable doubt that he specifically ordered militia
personnel to kill two named refugees during this meeting.
91
Interestingly, the Military Appeals Tribunal did not conduct a
historic analysis of civilian liability for war crimes such as the
Nuremburg tribunals. Nonetheless, the Appeals Tribunal upheld
the conviction for war crimes. 92 The appeals chamber then
reassessed his sentence to fourteen years imprisonment and
expulsion from Switzerland for fifteen years. 93
Niyonteze appealed to the Military Court of Cassation,
arguing that even if the facts accepted by the Military Appeals
Tribunal were true, these did not constitute war crimes in the
absence of a close link with armed conflict.94 The Military Court
of Cassation disagreed with this argument in articulating the two
elements of a war crime under the CPM. First, the class of
persons involved "extends to all individuals lawfully invested
with authority and who are expected to further or participate in
the war effort because of their capacity as officials or agents of
the state, or as persons who are de facto representatives of the
89 Id.
90Id. The Appeals Tribunal did not accept Niyonteze's impossibility
argument, finding he had complete control of his villagers and ordered
the attack. Moreover, the Appeals Tribunal considered his order to
"clear the brush" as doublespeak intended to inflame hatred. Id.
91 Id.92id
9' Id. at 6, 40-41. See also Oxman, supra note 5 at 233.
93 Niyonteze Trib. App., at 6
94 See Arrdt du Tribunal Militaire de Cassation (Military Court of
Annulment) (Apr. 27, 2001) 15-17, at
http://trial-ch.org/Fichiers/cassation-FN-27avril.pdf;
DAS MILITARKASSATIONSGERICHT, LE TRIBUNAL MILITAIRE DE
CASSATION [IT TRIBUNALE MILITAIRE SAID CASSAZIONE] (MILITARY
COURT OF ANNULMENT) (April 27, 2001) 15-17 [hereinafter Cassation
Judgment]
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government." 95 Second, the link between the offense and armed
conflict must be close.96 According to the cassation court, both
elements were established in Niyonteze's case. 9' Again, the
Court recognized civilian liability for war crimes.
As in the case of his argument before the Appeals
Tribunal, Niyonteze also argued lack of notice as to criminality.
The Military Court of Cassation dismissed this argument and
held that Niyonteze knew the criminalit ramifications of his
orders and acts.98 Ultimately, his conviction and sentence were
upheld. 99
As previously noted, Niyonteze's prosecution before a
Swiss military tribunal received little criticism from the
international community or human rights groups. For instance, a
Rwandan survivor's group welcomed "Switzerland's courage" in
bringing Niyonteze to trial. °° Likewise, Amnesty International
merely reported its occurrence, criticizing only the tribunal's
failure to ensure complete witness anonymity. 01 Additionally,
the International Committee for the Red Cross reported
Niyonteze's prosecution without comment. 102 Neither the
European Union nor the European Court of Human Rights has
seen fit to publicly criticize the prosecution.
II. Universal Jurisdiction and the Right to a Fair Trial
in International Law
Before an analysis of Switzerland's military tribunal can
be accomplished, a brief understanding of both universal
jurisdiction and the right to a fair trial must be achieved.
Universal jurisdiction has been defined as "a principle allowing






too See, e.g., Hirondelle, supra note 48.
101 Amnesty International, Switzerland, Report for 2001.
'02 See, e.g., State Department, country report, supra note 86.
VOL. 12
PROSECUTOR V. NIYONTEZE
including the nature of the crime, justify the repression of some
types of crime as a matter of international public policy." 103
Universal jurisdiction occurs where a state exercises jurisdiction
over offenses to which it has no geographic, in-personam, or
other nexus. 104 Offenses targeted for universal jurisdiction
typically involve war crimes, crimes against humanity, or other
jus cogens offenses. 10 5
Courts exercising universal jurisdiction are rare. Most
national courts deny jurisdiction over crimes that have no
geographic or personal nexus to them. However, where a court
exercises universal jurisdiction, greater scrutiny should be given
to its protection of due process rights, such as the right to a fair
trial. It has been observed that a primary role of a criminal court
is its truth-seeking function. 106 However, it has also been
recognized that this function does not occur without the
constraints of a fair trial. Such constraints include inter alia, a
103 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 304
(4th ed. 1990). See also, e.g., Eric S. Kobrick, The ex post facto
Prohibition and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction Over
International Crimes, 87 COLUM. L. REv 1515, 1524 (1987).
104 Kobrick, supra note 103, at 1519-1524.
105 Norms of jus cogens have been defined as "peremptory norms of
general international law." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679, 699.
The Vienna Convention describes these as norms "accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character." Id. The Restatement (Third) of
International Law provides that a state violates a norm ofjus cogens if
it "practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave
trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d)
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination,
or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights." Restatement (Third) § 702.
106 See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410
(1998); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990).
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presumption of innocence, 107 notice of criminality and
jurisdiction, 108 formal evidentiary rules, 109 the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" burden of proof,11° the accused's right to an
impartial judiciary,"' competent counsel, 1 2 the right to face his
107 See, e.g., ICTY Statute, Rule 87(a); ICTR Statute, Rule 87(a).
'0o See, e.g., ICC Statute, Article 22, reiterating the customary
international law principle of nullem crimen sine lege (no criminal
responsibility unless the conduct was criminal at the time it took place).
See also, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
109 See, e.g., David Leonard, Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence 413-415: The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political
Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 305, 310 (1995). Formal evidentiary
rules exist to ensure the ordered flow of justice, free of surprise, and as
a buffer against unreliable evidence. Rules also exist to protect areas of
privacy customarily protected in common law. See, e.g., Robert J.
Araujo, International Tribunals and Rules of Evidence: The Case for
Respecting and Preserving the "Priest-Penitent" Privilege Under
International Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 639 (2000). To date, the
ICC, ICTR, and ICTY do not per se recognize such privileges.
110 Under customary international law, the burden of proof for guilt in
trial appears to be similar to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
enunciated in United States courts. See ICC, Article 66(3). Article 66,
Presumption of innocence, subsection (c) reads, "In order to convict the
accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt." Id.
"1 For instance, the ICCPR provides: "In the determination of any
criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at
law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law."
ICCPR, at Art. 14(1). See also, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927); Piersack v. Belgium, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 174 (1982)
(European Court of Human Rights decreeing impartial judges as
essential to justice). See also European Convention on Human Rights,
art. 6 (1); and, Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human
Rights which provides: "Every person has the right to a hearing, with
due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent,
independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law."
ACHR, Art 8(1). See also, e.g., Sam Ervin Jr., Separation of Powers:
Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 108, 121 (1970);
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or her accusers,113 and the right to present a complete defense.' 14
Swiss criminal law, both military and civilian, appears to provide
each of these safeguards of a fair trial. For instance, an
Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary.- History and
Purposes, 21 DAYTON L. REV. 565, 567 (1996). Cox writes that the
concept of an independent, impartial judiciary dates at least to Lord
Coke's defense of common law judges against King James I in 1603,
followed by the 1701 Act of Settlement protecting judges against undue
influences from the crown. Cox at 568-70. Finally see Allen N.
Sultan, Autonomy under International Law, 21 DAYTON L. REV. 585,
659 (1996). Professor Sultan surveys the Roman, Greek, Hebrew,
Islamic, and Christian legal traditions and concludes that the failure to
provide an impartial judiciary rises to ajus cogens violation. Sultan at
659.
..2 See, e.g., Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, signed at Geneva August 12, 1949, Art. 99; ICTR Art. 20.
113 See, e.g., UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, SIXTH AMEND. See also
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (explaining: "In all criminal
prosecutions, state as well as federal, the accused has a right, guaran-
teed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him."') See
also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (applying Sixth Amendment
to the States). The Court has also stated that, "[t]he central concern of
the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence
against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the
context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact." Maryland
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). It should be noted that the United States
places upon its government a higher threshold to show the right to
confront witnesses as non absolute than do most other jurisdictions.
Exceptions have been carved out for cases involving national security
and child witnesses. See, e.g., Craig, 497 U.S. 836; see also United
States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The ICTR, ICTY, and
ICC permit adult witnesses to testify anonymously or via affidavit.
See, e.g., ICTR-96-4-T, appeal of Akayesu.
114 For a discussion on the right to present a complete defense, see
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (holding the right is not
without limits and is subject to rules of evidence).
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independent and impartial judiciary is guaranteed." 5 Likewise,
Swiss criminal law mandates a beyond a reasonable doubt
burden of proof upon the prosecution. 116 Moreover, standard
defenses such as mental responsibility, mistake of fact, and
notice are recognized."
17
In terms of the right to a fair trial, this article primarily
centers on notice and the right to competent counsel. These two
issues are related to universal jurisdiction because where a court
exercises universal jurisdiction, it is imperative that interna-
tionally recognized safeguards exist to ensure a fair trial.
Moreover, a defendant's representation by competent counsel, in
theory, provides a mechanism for ensuring the other "fair trial"
safeguards that are noted above.
A. Universal Jurisdiction
International law recognizes five general principles
granting a state jurisdiction over crimes: territorial; nationality
(or national); protective; universal; and, passive personal. 118
Territorial jurisdiction is based on the place where the offense is
committed." 9 It is the oldest accepted form jurisdiction under
customary international law.
120
National jurisdiction is based on the nationality or
national character of the offender.' 21 For example, where one
United States citizen commits a crime against another United
States citizen while both are in Canada, the crime may still be
115 Treschel, supra note 59, at 247.
116 See id.
117 Id. at 226-229.
118 United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257 (1st Cir. 1982). See also,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW sec. 421 (1986);
and, Kobrick, supra note 103, at 1519 (1987).
119 See, e.g., Smith 680 F.2d., at 257.
120 Patrick L. Donelly, Note: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts of
Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L. REv 599, 602 (1987).
121 Smith, 680 F. 2d., at 257.
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prosecuted in the United States. 122 Additionally, citizens
residing abroad who consort with the enemy in wartime or
violate tax obligations may be prosecuted under this principle.
123
Protective jurisdiction is based on whether a national
interest is injured. 124 Such interests include national security or
protection against severe economic manipulation. 25 Universal
jurisdiction, covered throughout this article, amounts to a
physical custody of the offender, despite a lack of direct nexus
between the state and the offense or victim. 26 Finally, 'passive-
personal' jurisdiction is based on the nationality or national
character of the victim. 27 Where a national becomes a victim
abroad, a state may exercise jurisdiction over the offender even
though the offense occurred outside the state's territory. 28 For
example, French law permits jurisdiction over foreigners who
assault and injure French nationals on foreign soil.
129
A sixth principle, called the objective territorial princi-
ple, now exists. 130 This principle allows a state to prosecute
122 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 103. See also Wade Esty, Note:
The Five Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Failure of the
Presumption Against Territoriality, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv 177, 182 (1997).
123 Esty, supra note 122, at 182-186, citing Chandler v. United States,
171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir 1948) and Container Corporation of America v.
Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
124 United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir 1979);
Zephyr R. Teachout, Note: Defining and Punishing Abroad:
Constitutional Limits on the Extraterritorial Reach of the Offenses
Clause, 48 DUKE L. J. 1305, 1311 (1999).
125 Teachout, supra note 124, atl311.
126 Smith, 680 F. 2d., at 258.
127 Id.
128 Brigitte Stem, International Decision: French Tribunal de grande
instance (Paris), 93 A.J.I.L. 696, 697 (1999).
129 Id. at 696. Stem writes that passive personality jurisdiction exists in
French law. Article 113-7 of the Penal Code establishes jurisdiction
over criminal acts committed abroad by a foreigner against a French
victim. Id. at 697.
30 Smith, 680 F. 2d 255, at 257-258.
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offenses that occur outside of its territory, but have a detrimental
effect to the state. 131 United States courts have recognized this
type of prescriptive jurisdiction. 132 The Restatement of Foreign
Relations defines prescriptive jurisdiction as the authority of a
state "to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or
status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by
legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or
regulation, or by determination of a court."' 
33
Based on the facts surrounding Niyonteze's apprehen-
sion and prosecution, it is clear that Switzerland exercised
universal jurisdiction in prosecuting him. Some scholars con-
clude that "universal jurisdiction fills a gap where other, more
basic doctrines of jurisdiction provide no basis for national
proceedings." 134 Universal jurisdiction occurs where a state
exercises jurisdiction over criminal offenses regardless of
whether any party to the offense, or the offense itself, has a
geographic nexus to the state. Often universal jurisdiction is
confused with a state's exercise of its "long arm" jurisdiction
over offenders.135 However, universal jurisdiction may be seen
as an evolutionary growth of the "long-arm" jurisdictional
exercise over crimes.
As World War II ended, allied representatives met in
London to conclude a charter detailing the "constitution,
jurisdiction and functions of the International Military Tribunal
(IMT), which conducted the Nuremberg trials."' 3 6 The concept
131 Id. at 258; Donnelly, supra note 120, at 611.
132 See Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d., at 10-11. See also Teachout, supra note
124, at 1311.
133 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 40 1(a) (2002).
134 Bruce Broornhall, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths,
Realities, and Prospects: Towards the Development of an Effective
System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes Under International Law,
35 NEW ENG. L. REV 339, 400 (2001).
135 id.
136 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis Powers and the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (Aug
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of universal jurisdiction for certain offenses gained initial
acceptance through the IMT and the International Military
Tribunals for Asia, 137 as well as the 1968 Israeli trial of Adolph
Eichmann.'38 Universal jurisdiction concepts developed in the
8, 1945). In the course of World War II, the Allied Governments
issued several declarations concerning the punishment of war criminals.
On October 7, 1942, it was announced that a United Nations War
Crimes Commission would be set up for the investigation of war
crimes. It was not until October 20, 1943, however, that the actual
establishment of the Commission took place. In the Moscow Declara-
tion of October 30, 1943, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Soviet Union issued a joint statement that the German war criminals
should be judged and punished in the countries in which their crimes
were committed, but that "the major criminals whose offenses have no
particular geographic localization" would be punished "by the joint
decision of the Governments of the Allies." SCHINDLER & TOMAN,
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS (1988), 911.
137 Schindler, supra note 136, at 911. "The International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo 1948) was established by a special
proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme
Commander in the Far East for the Allied Powers." Id. See also, Henry
T. King, Jr., Universal Jurisdiction.- Myths, Realities, War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity. The Nuremberg Precedent, 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 281, 283 (2001). Professor King writes:
In today's world, universal jurisdiction is a vital legacy of
Nuremberg. We should never forget that until Nuremberg it
was only national courts that could prosecute criminals for
crimes committed in that particular country. This concept was
bypassed by Nuremberg when it obliterated traditional aspects
of national sovereignty in its approach towards crimes against
peace and war crimes and when it articulated for the first time
the concept of crimes against humanity.
Id.
138 State of Israel v. Eichmann, Criminal case No. 46/61, (36 I.L.R. 5
(J.M.DC 1968)). In Eichmann, the court recognized universal
jurisdiction to prosecute an offense against the Jewish people that
occurred prior to the formation of the State of Israel. The court
specifically held:
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Eichmann trial have been accepted by other national or state
courts. For example, in the 1989 Ontario High Court of Justice
case, Regina v. Finta,139 a Canadian Court accepted the principle
that state courts can exercise criminal law jurisdiction "with
respect to acts which occurred outside its territory."'' 40 In the
field of tort law, the United States exercises universal
jurisdiction over some claims through the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991.14 These acts also added to the growing
The State of Israel's "right to punish," the Accused derives, in
our view, from two cumulative sources: a universal source
(pertaining to the whole of mankind) which vests the right to
prosecute and punish crimes of this order in every state within
the family of nations; and a specific or national source which
gives the victim nation the right to try any who assaults its
existence.
Id., at para. 30.
"9 1 S.C.R 701 (Can. 1994); 1994 CarswellOnt 1154, Cour Supreme
du Canada.
140 Id., (quoting the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
Steamship Lotus (1927)).
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a
state from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in
respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken
place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive
rule of international law. Such a rule would only be tenable if
international law contained a general prohibition in states to
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their
territory.
Id.
14' 28 U.S.C. 1350 et seq. This statute is also commonly known as the
Alien Tort Statute, the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Alien Tort Act.
See also, e.g., Doe v. Unocal - F.3d - (9th Cir. (Cal) 2002), 2002
WL 31063976; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1996)
(stating, the Alien Tort Claims Act "validly creates federal court
jurisdiction for suits alleging torts committed anywhere in the world
against aliens in violation of the law of nations."); and, Filartega v.
Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir 1979).
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acceptance that some offenses, such as genocide, constitute
crimes against humanity that can be prosecuted at any location
by any recognized court complying with basic procedural rights.
Additionally, international instruments exist which
recognize the efficacy of universal jurisdiction. For instance, the
1949 Geneva Conventions grant universal jurisdiction on the part
of all nations to prosecute alleged perpetrators of "grave
breeches of those conventions.' 142 The Conventions oblige a
state that is not prepared to prosecute a bona fide crime against
humanity, to hand over the suspect to another state that is
prepared to prosecute. 143 Likewise, the International Covenant
142 King, supra note 137, at 283. See also Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed
Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, Article 49 (Aug
12, 1949). Grave breaches include "wilful killing, torture or inhumane
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction
and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly" when such acts are "committed
against persons or property protected by the Convention." Id. at Article
50. See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at
Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, Articles 50-53; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Articles 129-131 (Aug 12, 1949);
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 28, Articles 146-148 (Aug.
12, 1949).
143 King, supra note 137, at 283. See also, Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed
Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, Artclie 49 (Aug
12, 1949); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at
Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, Articles 50-53; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Articles 129-131 (Aug 12, 1949).;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 28, Articles 146-148 (Aug.
12, 1949).
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on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), opened for signature in
1966, appears to give some recognition of universal jurisdiction
in Article 15.'44
Jurisdiction forjus cogens offenses, such as war crimes,
has been established for the ad hoc international tribunals
involving Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the International
Criminal Court (ICC). 145 National courts, however, "have
increasingly taken the lead in prosecuting foreigners for
international crimes committed outside of their borders." 146
Prior to 1999, several other countries exercised jurisdiction over
crimes for which there was no geographic or nationality nexus.
For instance, in 1991, Australia prosecuted a Ukranian
immigrant for crimes he committed against specific Jewish
individuals during World War II. 14' Likewise, Belgium has
asserted universal jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes
against humanity. 
148
Spain has argued for jurisdiction over General Augusto
Pinochet before the British courts based on atrocities committed
during his tenure as president of Chile. 149 It has been
144 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res.
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. Article
15(2) reads as follows: "Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial
and punishment of any person for any act or omission which at the time
it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of
the law recognized by the community of nations." Id.
145 Leila Nadya Sadat, Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEw ENG.
L. REV. 241, 242-243 (2001).
146 Id. at 243.
147 Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth, 172 C.L.R. 501 (Austl. 1991).
148 See, e.g., Luc Reydams, International Decisions: Belgian Tribunal
of First Instance of Brussels (Investigating Magistrate), November 8,
1998, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 700, 703 (1999) (finding universal jurisdiction
over crimes against humanity, under customary international law and
jus cogens, in case involving criminal complaints against Chile's
General Pinochet).
149 National Tribunal, Criminal Chamber in Plenary, Appellate no.
173/98 -first section, sumario 1/98, Order, Madrid, 5 Nov. 1998
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commented, however, that Spain's jurisdictional exercise over
General Pinochet was based on passive personality juris-
diction. 'SThis is because among Spain's jurisdictional argu-
ments, it was recognized that ninety-three victims listed in the
indictment against General Pinochet were Spanish.15' Further-
more, the Netherlands has attempted to obtain jurisdiction over
persons accused of crimes against humanity in its former colony,
Suriname. 152 Each of these states possesses advanced legal
systems considered to embody the procedural and substantive
rights contemplated in international law, as discussed below.
However, none of these states utilized a military court in their
prosecution attempts.
B. The Right to a Fair Trial: The Issue of
Competent Counsel and Notice
For reasons previously articulated, the right to competent
defense counsel and the principle of notice are endemic to the
(confirming Spanish jurisdiction to try former Chilean head of state
Augusto Pinochet for genocide, including torture, and terrorism
committed against Spanish nationals in Chile). See e.g., Ex Parte
Pinochet, Appeal, 24 March 1999.
0 See, e.g., Siegfried Weissner and Andrew R_ Williard, Policy-Oriented
Junsprudence and Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World
Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 A.J.I.L. 316,330 (1999).
151 id.
152 See, e.g., Douglass Cassell, Empowering United States Courts to
Hear Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 421, 426 f.n. 19 (2001) (citing Court
Amsterdam, Order of Nov. 20, 2000 (Bouterse case), accessible at
<http://www.rechtspraak.nl/gerechtshof/amsterdam> (visited Feb. 17,
2001)); Marlise Simons, Dutch Court Orders an Investigation of '82
Killings in Suriname, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at A12. The Dutch
Court found jurisdiction to investigate torture leading to death,
allegedly committed by former Surinamese military leader Desi
Bouterse against Surinamese citizens in Suriname, based on a retro-
spective application of the 1989 Dutch statute implementing the
Convention Against Torture. Id.
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concept of a fair trial. The concept of a fair "international trial"
dates to the postwar IMT at Nuremburg. 153 There are two
international understandings that bear on the general concept of a
fair trial for all persons, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) 5 4 and the ICCPR.155 Additionally, there are
153 The IMT Rules regarding Fair Trial are found in Section IV of the
London Charter. This section reads as follows:
Section IV: Fair Trial for Defendants.
Article 16. In order to ensure fair trial for the Defendants, the
following procedure shall be followed:
(a) The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying
in detail the charges against the Defendants. A copy of
the Indictment and of all the documents lodged with the
Indictment, translated into a language which he under-
stands, shall be furnished to the Defendant at a reasonable
time before the trial.
(b) During any preliminary examination or trial of a
Defendant he shall have the right to give any explanation
relevant to the charges made against him.
(c) A preliminary examination of a Defendant and his
Trial shall be conducted in, or translated into, a language
which the Defendant understands.
(d) A Defendant shall have the right to conduct his own
defense before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of
Counsel.
(e) A Defendant shall have the right through himself or
through his Counsel to present evidence at the Trial in
support of his defense, and to cross examine any witness
called by the Prosecution.
154 G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/uchr/ (last visited 2/23/04).
' G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 16) at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23,
1976, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a-ccpr.htm.
The preamble of the ICCPR states the purpose of the Covenant,
including the statement that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world" and that
"these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person." Id.
VOL. 12
PROSECUTOR V. NIYONTEZE
regional agreements, such as The American Convention on
Human Rights, 5 6 The European Charter on Human Rights,' 57
and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights,'58 all of
For a brief summary of the history of the ICCPR, see David P. Stewart,
United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.- The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and
Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183 (1993).
156 Nov 22, 1967, 9 I.L.M. 673, article 8, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-32.htm. See e.g., Article
8(2)(d) and Article 8(2)(e) which read in full:
(d) the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to
be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to
communicate freely and privately with his counsel;
(e) the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by
the state, paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the
accused does not defend himself personally or engage his own
counsel within the time period established by law.
Id.
157 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as
currently codified at 2000/C 364/01, available at
http://ue.eu.int/df/docs/en/CharteEN.pdf. See Article 47 which, in
part, reads: "Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously
established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being
advised, defended and represented." Id. This Charter is different than
the earlier 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, codified at 312 UNTS 221 (Nov 4,
1950). In the European Convention, Article 6 provides the right to a
fair trial. The right to counsel is enumerated at Article 6(3)(c) which
reads:
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of
his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for
legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice
so require.
Id.




U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
which recognize a right to counsel as part of the right to a fair
trial.
As noted above, the UDHR envisions a fair trial for all
accused persons. While the UDHR is an aspirational document
rather than binding law, it is central to the goal of achieving
universal justice. "9 Within the UDHR are two articles that
directly bear on the right to a fair trial. Article 10 enumerates the
right to a "fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal... of any criminal charge against him." 1
60
Likewise, Article 11 specifies the right to a presumption of
innocence, a prohibition against false imprisonment, as well as
protection from unjust punishment.'61
The ICCPR, on the other hand, is the primary
international law guarantor of the right to a fair trial. 62 Initially
opened for state signature in 1966, the ICCPR is composed of 51
articles and covers a wide array of basic individual rights such as
freedom of religion, liberty of movement, privacy rights, and the
right to a fair trial. 6 3 Under Article 14, an accused is provided
the "minimum guarantee" of the right to be tried in his own
presence. 164 Additionally the same article guarantees an accused
person the right to legal assistance and to be informed of this
s/Banjul%20Charter.pdf.
See Article 7(1)(c) which reads in full:"(c) the right to defence,
including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice." Id.
159 See, e.g., A EIDE ET AL. (eds) The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: A Commentary (1992). "The UDHR is not a treaty. It was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as a resolution
having no force of law. Its purpose, according to its preamble is to
provide a 'common understanding' of human rights and fundamental
freedoms." BUERGENTHAL ET AL. International Human Rights in a
Nutshell 39 (West Group, 3rd Ed. 2002).
160 Eide, supra note 159, at 159.
161 Id. at 175.
162 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 155, at 1183.
163 Id.
164 ICCPR, Art. 14(3)(d).
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right. 65 Moreover, an accused is entitled to have legal assistance
without payment where the accused is indigent. 166 ICCPR
Article 15 provides a threshold for notice.
16
1
In international practice, the right to competent counsel
exists in statutes. For instance the ICTR guarantees an accused
competent counsel of choice. 168 The ICTY makes the same
guarantee. 16  Article 67 of the Rome Statute also envisions
competent counsel, with adequate time to prepare for trial. 170
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 ICCPR, Article 15(a) reads:
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account
of any act or omission, which did not constitute a criminal
offense, under national or international law, at the time when
it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed
than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal
offense was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of
the offense, provision is made by law for the imposition of the
lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby.
Id.
168 ICTR Registry, Article 20(4)(b), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html.
169 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, sec. 21 (4)(d), which reads:
In the determination of any charge against the accused
pursuant to the present Statute, the accused shall be entitled to
the follwing minimum guarantees, in full equality: . . . to be
tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own chosing; to be informed, if
he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have
legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the
interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in
any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for
it.
Id., available for viewing at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statl 1-
2003.htm.
170 ICC Stat. Art. 67 [Rights of the Accused]. Subsections 67(l)(b) and
67(1)(d) read:
In the determination of any charge, the accused shall be
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However, persons exercising this right have met some
difficulties. For instance, in Prosecutor v. Tadic,171 the ICTY
Appellate Chamber appeared little concerned that one of Tadic's
counsel was under investigation for ethics violations at the same
time he was defending Tadic. 172 In Akayesu, covered in greater
detail below, the ICTR Appellate Chamber appeared to gloss
over real deficiencies in defense counsel performance.
Finally, under United States federal and military law, an
accused is guaranteed the right to competent counsel. 173 The
entitled to a public hearing, having regard to the provisions of
this Statute, to a fair hearing conducted impartially, and to the
following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of
the defence and to communicate freely with counsel of the
accused's choosing in confidence.
(d) Subject to article 63, paragraph2, to be present at trial, to
conduct the defense in person or through legal assistance of
the accused's choosing, to be informed, if the accused does not
have legal assistance, of this right and to have legal assistance
assigned by the Court in any case where the interests of justice
so require, and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient
means to pay for it.
Id.
171 Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-T (1994) (Hereafter IT-94-T).
172 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt
Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin (hereafter Contempt Proceeding),
January 31, 2000. Available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/vujin-e/index.htm. Tadic's counsel,
Milan Vujin was determined to have obstructed justice, threatened
witnesses, and subomed perjury. He investigated for these offenses
during his representation of Tadic. It did not occur to the Appellate
chamber that Vujin might have conflicting interests at this point. In
United States courts, attorneys with such conflicting interests are
generally prohibited from representing defendants, absent the
defendant's waiver. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 64
Led.2d 333, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (1980); and United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d
146, 153 (2d Cir. 1994).
173 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83
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right to counsel, however, does not confer an unfettered right to
"choice of counsel." 174 In Powell v. Alabama, 175 the Court
determined that an accused has the right to "a fair opportunity to
secure counsel of his own choice," provided such counsel is
available. 176 Availability of counsel has been expanded to
include affordability as well as scheduling availability. 177
Additionally, competency to practice restricts the right to
counsel. 178 Thus, the right to choose a specific counsel is not
absolute.
Il. Different Systems and Due Process: The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the
Swiss Military Court: A Study in Comparative Law
Analysis as to the efficacy and legitimacy of Prosecutor
v. Niyonteze may also be conducted in a comparative law
analysis within the dissection of specific cases. A natural trial
for comparison is the ICTR case of Akayesu, because of the
factual similarities between the two. Unlike Niyonteze, Akayesu
was sentenced to confinement for life. His trial lasted longer
than the Niyonteze trial, and substantial arguments were raised
S.Ct. 792 (1963); and Strickland v. Washington, 491 U.S. 617, 105
L.Ed.2d 528, 109 S.Ct. 2646 (1989). Gideon established the right to
counsel. Strickland extended this right to a guarantee of competent
counsel. However, it must be noted that this right does not provide for
flawless counsel. For military cases, see also United States v. Travels,
47 M.J. 83 (CAAF 1997); and, United States v. King, 30 M.J. 59
(1986).
174 See, e.g., Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 79 L. Ed. 2d 288,
104 S. Ct. 1051 (1984); and Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108
S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140, (1988).
17' 287 U.S. 45, 77 L.Ed. 158, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932).
176 Id. at 53.
177 See, e.g., Wheat, 486 U.S. 153, 160.
178 Id. See also, e.g., Daniel R. Hansen, Note: Do We Need the Bar
Examination? A Critical Evaluation of the Justifications for the Bar
Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. LAW. REV. 1191
(1995).
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regarding the competency of counsel, production of evidence,
and fairness of the proceedings. Niyonteze, on the other hand,
raised few of these arguments. Instead, he primarily argued lack
of jurisdiction, lack of notice, and sufficiency of evidence during
his appeal.
Prior to analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each
trial, it is important to briefly explain how the ad hoc ICTR came
into being, and then analyze its effectiveness in upholding "fair
trial standards." While the ICTR is not a court of universal
jurisdiction, it is similar in that the offenses covered are of the
same very egregious nature as offenses that various national
statutes envision obtaining jurisdiction over.
A. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
1. Rules and Procedure
The ICTR was established by the United Nations
Security Council in Resolution 955 on November 8, 1994."79 In
Resolution 955, the Security Council determined that the
situation in Rwanda "constitute[d] a threat to international peace
and security" within the meaning of Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter. 8 ° As a result, it established an ad-hoc tribunal
for prosecuting persons committing genocide, cimes against
humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Convention and Additional Protocol 11.181
179 UN Document S/RES/955 of 8 November 1994. For more
information about the incorporation of the ICTR visit:
http://www.ictr.org/default.htm.
18o Id.
18 1 Articles 1 through 4 read as follows:
Article 1: Competence of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have
the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for
such violations committed in the neighboring States between 1
January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in accordance with the
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provisions of the present Statute.
Article 2: Genocide
1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power
to prosecute persons committing genocide as defined in
paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the other
acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such:
a) Killing members of the group;
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part;
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
3. The following acts shall be punishable:
a) Genocide;
b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
d) Attempt to commit genocide;
e) Complicity in genocide.
Article 3: Crimes against Humanity. The International
Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute
persons responsible for the following crimes when committed
as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
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Rules governing the ICTR were promulgated on October 1, 1994
by the Security Council. These rules are found in the Annex to
Resolution 955.182 The ICTR rules govern, inter alia: jurisdic-
tion, trial and appellate procedure, selection and qualification of
judges, recognized defenses, prosecution, organization of the
ICTR, and rules of evidence and procedure.
Critics of the ICTR have argued its charging process
g) Rape;
h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
i) Other inhumane acts.
Article 4: Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Convention and of Additional Protocol II. The International
Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute
persons committing or ordering to be committed serious
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of
Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These
violations shall include, but shall not be limited to:
a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-
being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel
treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of
corporal punishment;
b) Collective punishments;
c) Taking of hostages;
d) Acts of terrorism;
e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced
prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
f) Pillage;
g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples;





lacked notice and tended to reflect ex-post facto charging. "'
However, this argument lacks merit in that summary execution,
genocide, and crimes against humanity were recognized as
criminal in the aftermath of the post World War II tribunals. The
primacy of the international tribunal has also been criticized.
The ICTR is designed to prosecute only a fraction of the 90,000
persons suspected in contributing to the genocide. 84 It is with
some irony that the genocide's leadership avoids a possible death
penalty in the international tribunal, while smaller criminal
actors will face it under Rwandan law.' 85 Since neither Akayesu
nor Niyonteze faced the potential of such a sentence, the death
penalty is not analyzed in any detail in this article.
2. Case Example: Prosecutor v. Jean
Paul Akayesu
a. Facts, Allegations, and Trial
Difficulties
During the Rwandan Genocide, Jean-Paul Akayesu
served as the bourgmestre (mayor) of the Taba Commune."'
This was an appointed, rather than elected, position. 18 7 In this
capacity, he was responsible for maintaining the law and public
order."'8 The trial court found that at least 2,000 Tutsis were
killed in the Taba commune between April and June of 1994.89
The trial court characterized the killings in Taba, as "openly
committed and so widespread that, as bourgmestre, [Akayesu]
must have known about them." 190 The court further held,
"although he had the authority and responsibility to do so,
183 See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 18, at 392-403. Alvarez discusses
criticisms of the ICTR charging process.
114 Id. at 393.
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[Akayesu] never attempted to prevent the killing of Tutsis in the
commune in any way or called for assistance from regional or
national authorities to quell the violence. ''1 9
Akayesu's role in the charged offenses was not merely
passive acquiescence. Several beatings, murders, and sexual
degradations occurred at and near his place of work. 192
Moreover, on at least one occasion he participated in ferreting
out Tutsis and suspected Tutsi sympathizers in house to house
searches.' 93 He further ordered the beatings of Tutsis to obtain
intelligence and ordered the local militia to kill several others.1
94
On April 19, 1994, he ordered the Hutu residents of Taba to kill
intellectual and influential people. 9' Based on these instruc-
tions, five secondary school teachers were hacked to death by
locals wielding machetes and agricultural implements. 196 On
several other occasions, he personally used threats of death and
torture to obtain information on the whereabouts of Tutsi
intellectuals.1
97
Akayesu was originally charged under several
specifications of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and
of Article 4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol 11.'98 Within the ambit
'9' Id. The court further listed specific offenses which Akayesu took







'98 Akayesu was specifically charged as follows:
Count 1: Genocide, punishable by Article 2(3)(a)
Count 2: Complicity in Genocide, punishable by Article
2(3)(e)
Count 3: Crimes Against Humanity (extermination),
punishable by Article 3(b)
Count 4: Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide,
punishable by Article 2(3)(c)
Count 5: Crimes Against Humanity, punishable by Article
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of each, he was specifically charged with murder, torture, rape,
incitement to commit genocide, cruel treatment, and other
inhumane acts. During trial, the prosecution was permitted to
amend its indictment and add the crime of rape under the aegis
of genocide and crimes against humanity. 199 The tribunal
convicted him of genocide, direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, and crimes against humanity.200 The trial was
conducted on-site, in Arusha, with easy access to witnesses and
evidence. On several occasions during the fourteen-month trial
and subsequent appeals, Akayesu expressed dissatisfaction with
3(a)
Count 6: Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions as incorporated by Article 4(a)
Count 7: Crimes Against Humanity, punishable by Article
3(a) of the Statute of the Tribunal
Count 8: Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions as incorporated by Article 4(a)
Count 9: Crimes Against Humanity (murder) punishable by
Article 3(a) of the Statute of the Tribunal
Count 10: Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions as incorporated by Article 4(a).
Count 11: Crimes Against Humanity (torture) punishable by
Article 3(f)
Count 12: Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions as incorporated by Article 4(a).
Count 13: Crimes Against Humanity (rape), punishable by
Article 3(g)
Count 14: Crimes Against Humanity (other inhumane acts),
punishable by Article 3(i)
Count 15: Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions and of Article 4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol 2
(outrages upon personal dignity, in particular rape, degrading
and humiliating treatment and indecent assault).
ICTR 96-4-T Judgment, at 147-148.; U.N. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, Nov.
8, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) at 4-5.
199 ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, supra note 198, 6.
200 Id. at 147-148.
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his defense counsel.2°'
b. The Trial and Appellate
Chamber's Decisions
Regarding the Right to
Competent Counsel
Akayesu raised several "fair trial" issues both during
trial and on appeal. Issues important to the analysis in this paper
are his dual claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that
the tribunal denied him of his choice of counsel.2 2 Initially,
Akayesu argued his inability to afford a counsel. The Tribunal
found Akayesu indigent, and, in accordance with the Directive
on Assignment of Defense Counsel, the Registrar of the Tribunal
assigned a Western European attorney, Mr. Johan Scheers as his
defense counsel.20 3 However, Mr. Scheers withdrew from the
tribunal due to financial disagreements with the tribunal, and the
Tribunal then found Scheers' unavailable.20 4 Akayesu was then
201 ICTR 96-4-T, Appeals Chamber Judgment, June 1, 2001, 45-49,
67.
202 Id. 44, 67.
203 Id. 45. See also ICTR 96-4-T, Appeals Chamber Judgment Annex
B, 1 June 2001 at A(a). In his second notice of appeal, Akayesu
charged:
The Court and the registrar deprived the Appellant of his right
to choose his Defence Counsel. He could not have his first
choice, Johan Scheers because.., the Registrar's Office. On 31
October 1996, Michael Kamavas, Mr. Scheers' assistant who
had contacted Scheers in Belgium, illegally coerced the
Appellant to "choose" him as defence Counsel in replacement
of Mr. Scheers. The Appellant dropped Michael Kamavas
because of his deceitful maneuvers. (sic)Moreover, it has
been discovered that Kamavas had been a candidate to work
as Prosecutor and that he has already written and stated that he
could never defend a "genocider."
Id., at A(2d)(a).
204 ICTR 96-4-T, Decision Concerning a Replacement of an Assigned
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appointed Michael Karnavas.2 °5 This substitution occurred on
October 31, 1996, and it resulted in a scheduled delay of trial
until January 9, 1997.206 However, on November 20, 1996,
Akayesu requested a further change in defense counsel.2 °7 He
specifically requested a Canadian attorney named Mr. Michael
Marchand. 20 8 The Tribunal denied this request, and, on January
9, 1997, the Registrar appointed Mr. Nicolas Tinagaye and Mr.
Patrice Monthe, over Akayesu's objection. 20 9 Akayesu then
attempted to represent himself.210 However, the Tribunal did not
permit this and kept Tiangaye and Monthe in their capacity as
his defense counsel.211
On appeal, Akayesu contended that in denying him his
Defense Counsel and Postponement of the Trial, October 31, 1996 at 2.
205 Id. at 3.
206 id.
207 ICTR 96-4-T, Decision on the Request of the Accused for the
Replacement of Assigned Counsel, 20 Nov. 1996 at 1-3.
208 ICTR 96-4-T, Appeals Chamber Judgment Annex B, supra note
203, at A(a). In his second notice of appeal, Akayesu complained:
Appellant's second choice was Mr. Marchand from Montreal,
Canada, who was present at the opening of his trial on 9
January 1997. The prosecutor knew he was present as
recognized... in the New York Times on 8 September 1998.
The Court and the Registrar illegally refused requests by Mr.
Marchand to address the Court and meet his client.
Id., at A(2d)(a). It appears, however, that Akayesu's arguments were
contrary to the Tribunal's understanding. The Tribunal asserted it
denied Mr. Marchand because Akayesu was already represented.
Therefore, if Akayesu desired Marchand, he would have to be
represented by Marchand pro bono. Marchand found this requirement
untenable. Moreover, at the time of Akayesu's request, Mr. Marchand's
credentials could not be verified by the trial chamber. See, e.g.,
Appellate Chamber Judgment, Akayesu's Ground of Appeal 51.
209 ICTR 96-4-T, Appeals Chamber Judgment Annex B, supra note
206, at A(a). See also ICTR 96-4-T, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
supra note 201, 51.
2 10 Id. 48.
211 id.
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choice of counsel, the Tribunal denied him the right to a fair
trial. 212 He further complained of ineffective assistance of
counsel.213 In response to these claims, the Appeals Chamber
held that an indigent person's right to counsel of his own
choosing requires the balancing of the right to choose against
ensuring "proper use of the Tribunal's resources., 21 4 Moreover,
the Appellate Chamber held, "in principle, the right to free legal
assistance of counsel does not confer the right to counsel of ones
own choosing."2 15 The Appeals Chamber concluded that the
right to choose a specific counsel applies only to an accused who
21can afford to pay for counsel. 16 The Chamber found it
212 Id. 49-51.
213 Id. 67; ICTR 96-4-T, Appeals Chamber Judgment Annex B, supra
note 203, at B. The underlying basis for this complaint involved
several factors. First, neither defense counsel contacted Mr. Scheers
for his prior case-work and advice, despite the fact Akayesu gave both
counsel permission. Second, the defense counsel called as an expert
witness, General Romeo Dallaire, the United Nations commander who
testified that a genocide had taken place. Thirdly, Akayesu alleged his
defense counsel disclosed privileged statements. Fourth, Akayesu
charged that his attorneys made no effort to secure expert assistance to
rebut the Prosecution's main expert, Dr. Alison DeForges. Fifth,
Akayesu averred his defense counsel failed to probe for bias against
any of the Prosecution's witnesses. Finally, Akayesu argues that in not
advising Akayesu of his right to testify, or encouraging testifying, his
defense counsel were ineffective. Id.
214 ICTR 96-4-T, Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 201, 60.
215 Id. 61.
216 Id. The Appeals Chamber relied on a past decision, Prosecutor v.
Kambanda, in holding,
... in the light of textual and systematic interpretation of the
provisions from the Human Rights Committee and the organs
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, that the right to free legal
assistance by counsel does not confer the right to choose one's
counsel.
Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Kambanda, ICTR 97-23, Appeals Judgment,
19 Oct. 2000 at 11-12).
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compelling that Akayesu was permitted to release counsel on
217two separate occasions. In terms of not permitting Akayesu
the right to defend himself, the Appeals Chamber noted that at
several occasions, "his attitude toward the [Trial] Chamber
suggested otherwise."218
In determining whether Tiangaye and Monthe were
competent counsel, the Appeals Chamber noted that the ICTR
standard of review is "gross incompetence. '' 219 As a starting
point, the Appeals Chamber presumes counsel is competent,
220
placing the burden of proof on the defendant. In order to
establish "gross incompetence," an accused would have to
demonstrate that there is "reasonable doubt as to whether a
miscarriage of justice resulted., 22' In establishing this standard,
the Appeals Chamber adopted the ICTY's holding in Prosecutor
v. Tadic.222 In Tadic, the ICTY held the standard of determining
effectiveness is a "fact-based determination" where the Appeals
217 Id. 63.
218 d. 65.
219 Id. 77. The Appeals Chamber noted the right to competent counsel
is guaranteed under Article 14 of the ICCPR, Article 6the European
Convention on Human Rights, and, Article 8 of the American
Convention on Human Rights. Id.
220 Id. 78.
221/Id. 77.
222 Id, citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY, IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, Oct. 15, 1998 65. In that case the ICTY Appeals Chamber
held:
When evidence was not called because of the advice of
defence counsel in charge at the time, it cannot be right for the
Appeals Chamber to admit additional evidence in such a case,
even if it were to disagree with the advice given by counsel.
The unity of identity between client and counsel is indispen-
sable to the workings of the International Criminal Tribunal.
If counsel acted despite the wishes of Appellant, in the
absence of protest at the time, and barring special circum-
stances which do not appear, the latter must be taken to have
acquiesced.
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Chamber is unwilling to "second-guess" the tactical decisions of
defense counsel.223 On a final note, it should appear troubling
that so little due process analysis was conducted regarding
Akayesu's complaints.
B. Specific Right to a Fair Trial and
Switzerland's Exercise of Universal
Jurisdiction
Thus far, this article has provided an overview and
comparative analysis of Prosecutor v. Niyonteze. The article has
also analyzed the evolution and uses of universal jurisdiction, as
well as a defendant's right to a fair trial in international law.
Next, this paper will apply selected fair trial concepts, such as
the right to competent counsel and notice and other procedural
rights to this case.
1. Swiss Military Law
a. Overview of Procedure and
Basic Rights
Swiss military law permits a tribunal to exercise
universal jurisdiction over individuals accused of war crimes.
224
Under the CPM, jurisdiction over war crimes extends both to
declared wars and undeclared conflicts. 225 The code was first
223 Id.
224 CPM Art 2, sec 9. See also, e.g., Treschel, supra note 59, at 221. It
should be noted that the Swiss Penal Code recognizes universal
jurisdiction for a limited number of offenses. These include
counterfeiting money, narcotics distribution, and certain acts of
terrorism. Id.
225 CPM, Article 108 - scope of application reads:
1. The provisions in this section shall be applied in the event
of declared wars and other armed conflicts between two or
more states violations of neutrality and resistance to them by
force are equated with such events.
Id. CPM Article 109 - Violation of the laws of war, reads:
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enacted in 1927.226 However, this exercise has occurred only
twice since the rule's inception. As noted above, Niyonteze was
not the first foreign defendant to face charges before a Swiss
military court. In the 1997 trial of In re G,2Z7 the accused was
charged with war offenses under the CPM. 22' Like Niyonteze, G
was apprehended while in Switzerland.2 29 While the military
tribunal found it had jurisdiction over G, he was fully acquitted
based on insufficiency of evidence against him.
2 30
1. Whosever acts contrary to the provisions of international
agreements on the conduct of hostilities and the protection of
persons and property, whosoever violates other recognized
laws and customs of war,shall, unless more severe penalties
apply, be punished by imprisonment and, in serious cases, by
imprisonment with hard labor.
Id.
226 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for Inter-
national Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice,
42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 144 (2001). Bassiouni states that Switzerland's
Code Penal Militaire, enacted by the Federal law of June 13, 1927 and
amended up to February 29, 2000, contains a jurisdictional basis for
universal jurisdiction in Article 9, which states in paragraph 1: "Le
present code est applicable aux infractions commises en Suisse et a
celles qui ont ete commises a l'etranger." Chapter 6, Articles 108-109
are also a basis for universal jurisdiction for "infractions commises
contre le droit des gens en cas de conflit arme." Id.
227 In re G, Military Tribunal, Division 1, Lausanne, Switzerland, April
18, 1997, reported in 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 78 (1998).
228 Id. G was accused of beating and injuring civilian prisoners in
Omarska and Keraterm between May 30, 1992 and August 15, 1992.
He was also accused of forcing prisoners to perform degrading acts
such as licking the boots of camp guards. Id.229 Id. 36.
230 Id. The tribunal considered the charges to fall within the scope of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, and to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, as well
as the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
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Before further analyzing the tribunal's exercise of
universal jurisdiction, it is important to take note of both
Switzerland's military organization and basic Constitutional
rights of accused persons before Swiss courts. The Swiss
military is comprised of conscripted males. The Constitution
decrees universal service, with the possibility of conscientious
objection, for all men.3 Women who serve do so on a strictly
volunteer basis. 2 2 The Swiss military has a separate criminal
code. 233 The current code has its roots in a code of war
developed in 1393.3 This criminal code, however, embodies
the same Constitutional guarantees found in Swiss penal law.235
The CPM applies primarily to persons in the army. 36 However,
during times of war, the jurisdiction (ratione personae) of the
CPM expands considerably.
237
The Swiss military is governed by the central govern-
ment rather than independently commanded by the various
Canton governments.238 However, each canton is responsible for
maintaining a militia and implementing the Swiss military
International Armed Conflicts of 1977.
231 CONST. SWITZ., art. 59.
232 id.
233 See, e.g., Treschel, supra note 59, at 215-218. The military penal
code was first drafted in 1927. Id.
234 See, e.g., Office of the Armed Forces Attorney General of
Switzerland, at www.vbs.admin.ch/intemate/OA/e/urteile.htm, (last
viewed March 23, 2003).
235 Treschel, supra note 59, at 215-218. The current national penal
code has its roots in the first penal code of 1853. In 1982, the Federal
Government incorporated war crimes into the penal code. Id.236 Id. at 218, citing S.R. 321.0.
237 Id. See also CPM, Article 2 sec 9 which reads: "Those subject to
military law are: Civilians who, in the event of armed conflict, commit
violations of international law." Id.
238 Swiss Constitution, supra note 209, at Article 58(3). It should be
noted, however, that the Army is mobilized on a militia principle and
the independent Cantons may maintain their militia's beyond the
Confederation's supervisory control dates.
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criminal procedure. Under the CPM, where an individual is
suspected of a crime and a decision for trial is reached, a
preliminary procedure is ordered.239 This preliminary procedure
is mandated in cases of murder and war crimes. It is somewhat
similar to the preliminary investigation held by the United States
military under the Universal Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
Article 32. If the CPM preliminary proceeding determines that
prima facie evidence exists for trial, a military tribunal is
established for the accused.2 40 An accused is generally tried in a
military court located in the Canton in which he is found.24 1
Trials are primarily initiated through the order of a regimental
commander under normal conditions. However, where a war
crime is alleged, the Military Attorney General takes jurisdiction
of charging.24 2
Military courts are comprised of five members. 243 This
includes a president who is an "officer of the military justice. 2 44
The other four members are usually two officers and two non-
commissioned soldiers from the same unit as the accused. The
president of the court usually has no prior contact with the other
four members.245 In this setup, the Swiss military courts appear
similar to United States military court-martials prior to the post
World War II reforms. However, unlike United States court-
martials, military trials in Switzerland are rarely held. Indeed,
since 1988, only one hundred and thirteen trials have been
conducted.24 6
The Swiss Constitution provides a right of speedy trial







246 This statute is available on the Office of the Armed Forces, Attorney
General website at www.vbs.admin.ch/intemate/OA/e/urteile.htm (last
viewed Mar. 21, 2003).
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where a detention occurs.247 Additionally, once in detention, all
persons accused must be informed, in a language the individual
understands, of the reasons for their detention and notice of the
charges against them.242 Where both the Swiss Constitution and
CPM differ from international law norms is in the right to
counsel.249 Prior to 1982, Switzerland did not per se recognize a
right to defense counsel in criminal cases.250 This lack of
recognition was premised on the active and impartial role of
judges.251 However, because Switzerland is a party to the
European Convention on Human Rights, defense counsel are
appointed in all criminal cases.252 Swiss law recognizes that the
defense counsel's sole task "is the legitimate interest of the client
in watching over the legality of the proceedings." 253 Although
appointment of counsel is now mandated through other means,
the Swiss Constitution remains silent on the issue.
Article 32 of the Swiss Constitution enumerates the
presumption of innocence as an inherent right.25 4 This right
247 Article 31, Constitution of Switzerland, 1999.
248 Id. at Article 3 1(b). This article reads:
Everyone deprived of their liberty has the right to be informed
immediately, and in a language they understand, of the reasons
for their detention and the rights they enjoy. They must have
the opportunity to assert their rights. In particular, they have
the right to have their close friends and relations informed.
Id.
249 id.
250 Id. See also, Francis William O'Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel
in Civil Cases? The Swiss Approach, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 PASSIM (1967).
Criminal defendants are not provided counsel for numerous reasons
including the active participation and differing responsibilities of Swiss
judges in the trial. Id. (citing, Judgment of Oct. 8, 1937, BGE 63 I 209
(Switz.)).
251 Id.
252 Id.; CONST. SWITZ., art. 32.
253 Treschel, supra note 59, at 240.
254 Id. Article 32 specifically reads:




extends to the Swiss military courts. 255 Switzerland does not
permit capital punishment for any offense.256 Moreover, it will
not extradite criminals to a country where "cruel and inhuman
treatment or punishment" is permitted. 257 It was on this basis,
the possibility of a capital sentence, that Niyonteze was not
extradited to Rwanda.
Defenses recognized under both Swiss penal law and the
CPM include necessity (self-defense), duress, and "soundness of
mind" (insanity). 258 The "mistake of fact," defense is accepted in
some cases. 2 59 Ignorance of the law is a defense to a crime
where criminal intent is based on knowledge of the law.26 ° Such
ignorance is not a defense where the offense is based on
negligence. 26' All Swiss courts employ the reasonable doubt
standard, and there are substantial rights of appeal through the
(2) All those who are accused have the right to be informed as
soon as possible, and in full detail, of the accusations against
them. They must be able to exercise their rights of legal
defense.
(3) All those who have been sentenced have the right to have
their judgment reviewed by a higher court. This does not
apply to cases where the Federal Tribunal sits as the court of
first instance.
CONST. SWITZ., art. 32.
255 See Treschel, supra note 59, at 242. 244, 254.
256 Id. at 233. The CPM, which until 1992 allowed the administration
of capital punishment, enabled the execution of seventeen persons
during World War II. Id. (citing PETER NOLL, Landsverrdter. 17
Lebenslidufe und Todesurteile, 1942-1944, Frauenfeld/Stuttgart,
(1980)).
257 SWITZ. CONST., art. 25, available at: the website of the "Federal
Republic of Switzerland,"
http://www.admin.ch/ch/itl/rs/l/c 101 ENG.pdf.
258 Teschel, supra note 59, at 223-225.
259 Id. at 227-228.
260 Id. at 228.
261 Id. at 227.
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Federal Court.262 Additionally, in the CPM there is a court of
cassation to determine issues of law.263 Thus, the Swiss system
meets basic internationally recognized requirements of ensuring
a fair trial.
b. Notice of Criminality and
Jurisdiction
As noted above, Niyonteze sought asylum in
Switzerland in late 1994. In essence, he became a stateless
person willing to accept the jurisdiction of Switzerland.6 States
of asylum have prosecuted refugees for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed before the grant of asylum
occurred.2 65 However, there is no widespread agreement as to
the criminal jurisdiction status of refugees.266 Prosecutor v.
Niyonteze may establish, amid a corpus of international law, that
asylum is not a bar to prosecution. Nor should it be a bar.
Niyonteze sought asylum in Switzerland, in part, to avoid
prosecution. He certainly left Rwanda to avoid retribution.
Clearly, his post-offense actions indicated a knowledge of
wrongfulness. Interestingly, Niyonteze did not raise the issue of
extradition to the ICTR at his trial, nor did he seek extradition to
Rwanda. Since World War II, there has existed a developed
corpus of law indicating the severity of war crimes. By
262 Id. at 254, 263.
263 Id. at 263-264.
264 See Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmdny, The Nationality Principle of the
Offender and the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 95
AM. J. INT'L. L. 606, 619 (2001).
265 Id. at 619 (citing, RUTH WEDGWOOD, National Courts and the
Prosecution of War Crimes, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCE-
DURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 390,
401 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000).
But see Brigitte Stem, International Decisions: In re Javor, In re
Munyeshyaka, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 525, 527-528 (1999) (reporting
prosecution of a Hutu residing in France for crimes committed before
his residence in France).
266 Deen-Racsmdny, supra note 264, at 619-620.
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exercising jurisdiction over Niyonteze, Switzerland did not
violate either notice of criminality or notice of jurisdiction.
c. Other Fair Trial
Considerations: Competent
Representation
Niyonteze appears to have been ably represented by his
defense counsel through the entire trial and appellate process. At
no stage in the proceedings was an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim raised. Although the record of trial is not
verbatim, it also appears that significant issues of law were
argued. This fact provides some basis for a belief that Niyonteze
was competently represented. Certainly, his assigned lawyers
had competent criminal law backgrounds in defending him. Mr.
Assael has previously taught criminal law at the University of
Geneva.267 Mr. Spira practiced criminal law as a partner in an
established Geneva law firm.2 68 In contrast with the Akayesu
defense team, neither attorney representing Niyonteze was called
into question for ethical breaches or ineffective counsel.
2. Historic Reasonableness in
International Law for Exercising
Universal Jurisdiction in Prosecutor v.
Niyonteze
As a starting point in analyzing Niyonteze, a question
arises as to whether Switzerland violated any international law
norms in exercising universal jurisdiction. As noted in the
discussion and analysis above, universal jurisdiction has gained
acceptance for the most heinous (jus cogens) offenses. Indeed,
several states now exercise universal jurisdiction through their
civil courts. Niyonteze's role in the Rwandan genocide constitu-
ted crimes against humanity. Yet Switzerland was under no
267 See Biography for Robert Assael, at
http://www.ptan.ch/eng/partners/assael-robert.htm. (last visited Sept.
28, 2003).
268 See Biography for Vincent F. Spira, at http://www.avocats-
sld.ch/cvE.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2003).
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obligation to prosecute Niyonteze because of the existence of the
ICTR. While Switzerland was not a member of the United
Nations until this year, this fact did not appear to be the reason
for the exercise of jurisdiction. Switzerland could have
extradited Niyonteze to the ICTR. For instance, the United
States extradited a Seventh Day Adventist Pastor, Elizaphan
269Ntakirutimana, to the ad hoc tribunal in 2002. Switzerland's
reason to prosecute Niyonteze appears to rest in the
government's confidence in its military justice system over that
of the ICTR's ability to ensure due process. 270 Additionally,
Niyonteze did not argue for extradition to the ICTR.271
Switzerland's exercise of universal jurisdiction, unlike
Belgium's, might be more acceptable to the international
community for another, equally important reason. Switzerland
was never a colonial power in Africa. Its financial ties to either
the Hutu or Tutsi appear to be minimal, if any. During
Belgium's conquest and occupation of the Congo and occupation
of Rwanda, that nation's military and civilian administrative
officers engaged in what can easily be labeled today as "war
crimes."
272
Belgium is not the only European state claiming a right
to universal jurisdiction. France, for example, envisions that
courts try war crimes, although with greater jurisdictional
269 See Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5"h Cir 1999), cert denied
528 U.S. 1135, 120 S. Ct. 977, 145 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2000).
270 Notes from personal interview with Mr. Spira, conducted via email,
March 12, 2003.
271 Id.
172 Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and
Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. J.
INT'L L 1, 64 (1999) (citing, M.F. LINDLEY, The Acquisition and
Government of Backward Territory in International Law: Being a
Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion, 112-
13 (photo reprint 1969)(1926). Professor Anghie writes of Belgian




hurdles than Belgium. 273 For jurisdiction, there must be some
connection to France, such as the defendant being found within
274France. However, France could be accused of selective
prosecution. During the Franco-Algerian War (1955-1962) it is
estimated, that between 250,000 and 500,000 civilians were
killed. 275 In 1968, France granted a general amnesty for
infractions during the Franco-Algerian war, including war
crimes. 27 6 Amidst this amnesty are continuing allegations that
the French military and civilian administration employed torture
and other inhumane actions to subdue the Algerians.277 ,There
273 See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 226, at 139-42, 145.
2 74 See, e.g., id., (citing GILBERT AZIBERT, CODE DE PROCEDURE PENAL
2000, AT 459 ET SEQ. (12th ed. LITEC 2000), where he comments on
extraterritorial jurisdiction, but does not refer to universal jurisdiction.
The Code permits universal jurisdiction if it is included in an
international convention that France has ratified, provided that the
crime in question is also a crime under French law).
275 See, e.g., Amnesty International Report, France 2002; see also
General Paul Aussaresses, Services SPECIAUX ALGERIE 1955-1957
(Paris: Perrin, 2001) at 44-45. General Aussaresses biographical
account in his book, SERVICES SPECIAUX, ALGERIE 1955-1957, of
tortures and other methods has caused considerable uproar and led to
his prosecution. He, along with other soldiers, were previously granted
immunity from prosecution in the mid-1960's as part of an amnesty
program enacted by President de Gaulle. However, his recent
prosecution was for glorifying war crimes, and not the actual




276 See, e.g., Former General Faces Algeria Charges, CNN.com, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/Europe/05/17/france.algeria.inquir
y/index.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
277 For example, French Paul Aussaress has been convicted of only
"justifying war crimes" in his biography, which records his, as well as
other soldiers', torture of Algerians during the 1957-1962 Franco-
Algerian war. See GENERAL PAUL AUSSARESSES, THE BATTLE OF THE
CASBAH, viii, 49-50 (Enigma Books 2002)(2001). See also Judy
Scales-Trent, African Women in France: Immigration, Family, and
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are persons responsible for these offenses in both Belgium and
France today. Yet none have ever been brought to trial. In part,
this resulted from general amnesties being granted to likely
classes of defendants in the late 1960's and 1970s.278 However,
there is a growing argument that domestic amnesty laws should
not bind courts exercising jurisdiction over jus cogens
offenses.279
Likewise, where Belgium has contemplated prosecuting
foreign individuals, the country appears to have vested financial
or historic interests in the regions that the individuals originate
from. Thus, Switzerland appears a better candidate to exercise
universal jurisdiction as it is situated to withstand otherwise
valid criticisms of politically motivated and selective prosecution
that a country like Belgium may not be able to resist.
Additionally, this issue directly impacts the concept of an
impartial tribunal, as state appointed judges are directed to
preside over such trials.
IV. Conclusion
Prosecutor v. Niyonteze met or surpassed international
standards of the right to a fair trial. It also was a reasonable
exercise of universal jurisdiction. Indeed, the prosecution may
have created a higher standard for other domestic prosecutions of
war crimes and crimes against humanity. That Switzerland
utilized a military tribunal to achieve justice in this case in no
way lessened the value of the prosecution.
Yet, increased domestic prosecutions should be a
troubling concept. While it is true most Western European
Work, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L., 705, 706 (1999) (referring to a massacre
of hundreds of Algerian peaceful demonstrators by French military).
278 See, e.g., Amnesty International Report, France/Algeria: France
must now face up to judicial obligations (May 3, 2001).
279 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal
Jurisdiction, 35 NENG. L. REV. 311, 313 (2001) (reporting that a
Spanish Appeals Chamber used domestic law to uphold jurisdiction
over Augusto Pinochet, despite his grant of amnesty in Argentina).
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courts adhere to fair trial standards in the ICCPR and other
human rights agreements, the exercise of universal jurisdiction is
open to charges of selective prosecution and post-colonial
paternalism. Certainly, France and Belgium are open to
allegations of paternalism, selective prosecution, and denial of
the right to a fair trial.
Additionally, such prosecutions potentially deprive
domestic courts of reforming respect for human rights from
within. Likewise, international tribunals, while currently slow
and cumbersome in their infancy, should be given a chance to
develop a usable corpus of law and procedure. This may, in
turn, spark an interest in states not currently accepting the ICC's
jurisdiction, to reconsider their absence.
Finally, while Switzerland should be commended for its
prosecution of Niyonteze, it must be noted that few states are
capable of prosecuting war crimes in the rarified and
disinterested atmosphere of the Swiss courts. Thus, such a
prosecution should occur rarely, and only in instances where an
international tribunal or domestic court is incapable of both
pursuing a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction and ensuring a fair
trial.
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